Liberals out out of step with mainstream America President Obama apologizes The broken pledge has been made worse by the utter mismanagement of the Obamacare enrollment system. Irreparable damage on the national level aside, after hawking the Affordable Care Act like a snake oil salesman, barking "Step right up, if you like your insurance plan you can keep your insurance plan," some gravely ill Americans are finding out that the cure-all the merchant of "Hope and Change" peddled was pure quackery.
Using an unabashedly economistic approach, he tries to explain how dictators stay in power, how political repression and economic performance interact, the nature of democratic inaction and nationalism, and how bureaucracies function.
Wintrobe begins with a formal model of autocracy, which specifies that dictators maximize a weighted average of power and personal consumption.
Whatever their preferences, dictators must divide their resources between repressing opponents and rewarding loyal followers. But his emphasis on imperfect information and imperfect enforcement is more fruitful.
In democracies, explains Wintrobe, people can express their preferences without fear of punishment, and they can retaliate at the ballot box against leaders who break their promises.
These responses are hardly perfect solutions to the information and enforcement problems, but in dictatorships the situation is worse: Thus, according to Wintrobe, Stalin may have been extraordinarily ruthless, but he was not irrational if we look at the effects of the terror from his point of view.
Dictators create loyalty the same way firms do: Most people have no pecuniary incentive to aid causes or leaders that will benefit them, or to struggle against their oppressors.
After Rockefeller’s unceremonious ejection, the yacht was then buzzed by Blackhawk helicopters before French fighter jets gave a warning pass overhead, whereupon the helicopters retreated. Major challenges facing Africa in the 21st century: A few provocative remarks Ibrahim Farah, systems of political rule” with strong democratic foundations. I argue that the . The causes of political globalization, as laid out by Huntington, are the deep legitimacy problems of authoritarian regimes, the unprecedented global economic growth of the s, a striking shift in the doctrine and activities of the Catholic Church, changes in the policies of external actors, most notably the European Community, the United.
A few activists can look forward to wealth and power in exchange for their loyal service to a political cause; but for the most part, a change in policy or regime is a public good that apathetic bystanders can enjoy as much as dissidents who risk their lives. Consider this simple example from Wintrobe: Suppose, for example, that a politician obtains a dam or bridge or other pork-barrel project for the citizens in his or her district.
A proper cost-benefit analysis will reveal that the project is wasteful. Indeed, if the project is not wasteful, citizens have no reason to give their support to that politician in exchange for the dam or bridge, because the politician is making no sacrifice on their behalf but is simply doing what any technocrat would do.
If supporters and nonsupporters alike enjoy the same benefits, the incentive to be a supporter rather than nonsupporter is nil. But those facts constitute a puzzle fornot a routine implication ofeconomic theory.
The puzzle does have a solution; one excellent formulation appears in Geoffrey Brennan and Loren E.
Cambridge University Press, As Brennan and Lomasky explain, the logic of collective action does not kill politics, because expressive rather than instrumental tastes are the main motive for political action and opinion. Risking your life for your beliefs is usually a very foolish way to get rich, but it is a perfectly rational way to stand up for what you believe is right.
An important implication is that, in politics, expressive concerns matter a lot more than they do for private decisions. Brennan and Lomasky focus on democratic decision making, but their analysis almost surely has fascinating implications for dictatorship, too.
In spite of any problems, The Political Economy of Dictatorship is well written, engaging, and filled with fascinating examples and astute observations. Wintrobe belongs to a growing contingent of contemporary thinkers, including Timur Kuran, Tyler Cowen, Donald Wittman, Geoffrey Brennan, and Loren Lomasky, who apply rigorous economicswritten in plain Englishto broad, substantive questions.**Managers operating in a totalitarian state must make decisions based on political rather than economic standards.
Typically, local companies are favored over foreign firms forcing multinational companies to make business deals that would not occur in a democratic environment.
Start studying Chapter 2 - National Differences in Political, Economic, and Legal Systems. Learn vocabulary, terms, and more with flashcards, games, and other study tools. Sep 02, · political and economic power in contemporary zimbabwe – past policies and future political and economic developments.
Money and power are often seen as going hand in hand. However, this lesson demonstrates that, while political and economic changes often accompany.
Tony Cartalucci - Just a Lousy Journalist?. 18 th April London.
Tony Cartalucci. Tony Cartalucci has written prolifically on the political turmoil in Thailand. His writing focuses on the International dimension; the foreign interference in Thailand.
Political Institutions, Economic Growth, and Democracy: The Substitute Effect shows that “the expected life of democracy in a country with per capita income under $1, is about eight years.